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List of Acronyms
• Configuration logic block (CLB)
• Device under test (DUT)
• Edge-triggered Flip-Flop (DFF)
• Fault Injection(FI)
• Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
• Linear Energy Transfer (LET)
• Lookup table (LUT)
• Number of configuration bits (NT)
• Single Event Effects (SEEs)
• Single Event Transient (SET)
• Single Event Upset (SEU)
• Static random access memory (SRAM)
• Total number of configuration bits for one fault injection campaign ( #BitFI_inj)
• Time for total fault injection (TfI_total) 
• Time to flip one configuration bit ( tFI_inj ) 
• Time to wait for error response (twait)
• Time to correct the inverted configuration bit tcorr
• Time to reset functionality ( trst)
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Abstract
• Informative session regarding SRAM FPGA 
basics.
• Presenting a framework for fault injection 
techniques applied to Xilinx FPGAs.  
• Introducing an overlooked time component that
illustrates fault injection is impractical for most
real-designs as a stand-alone characterization
tool.
• Demonstrating procedures that benefit from 
fault injection error analysis.
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Question: Why are you performing fault 
injection?… 
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Single Event Upset Analysis
• We define error-event stimuli as sources
applied to internal DUT structures that can
potentially cause DUT malfunction; e.g.:
– Ionizing particles,
– Laser pulses, or
– Forced logic-state inversion (fault injection (FI)).
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Application of Error Stimuli
• Involves a variety of considerations such 
as: 
– Invoking a large enough event space for 
proper statistics, 
– Avoiding unrealistic fault accumulation, and 
– Respecting the amount of time required for an 
error event to reach an observable test point.
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• In this presentation, we 
focus on:
– The application of error-
event stimuli to Xilinx Virtex
FPGA devices in the form of 
fault injection .
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NT= Total Number of 
Configuration Bits
General Xilinx Virtex FPGA Architecture
Functional Logic
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SRAM-Based FPGAs: SEUs and Fault 
Injection (FI)
• SRAM-based FPGAs can incur SEUs in:
– Configuration bits,
– Functional logic (data path transistors –
combinatorial logic and flip-flops (DFFs)),
– Global routes, or
– Hidden logic structures (inaccessible to the user).
• Although all internal structures to the FPGA 
have a susceptibility to SEUs, we limit the 
scope of this study to fault injection in the 
configuration memory only.
We study how configuration-bit SEUs affect 
associated Xilinx components 
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SRAM-Based Configuration FPGA FI
• SRAM-based 
Configuration fault 
injection:
– Flip the state of a 
configuration bit.
– Wait and attempt to 
detect if an error occurs 
after the configuration 
bit-state is changed (not 
all configuration bits are 
used – not all flips will 
cause an error 
response).
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Goals of SRAM-based Configuration 
FPGA FI
• Determine which configuration bits can affect 
circuit behavior (sensitive configuration bits).
• Investigate Potential Error Responses.
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Configuration-bit FI does not determine error 
rates.
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Determining Sensitive Configuration Bits
• Not all configuration bits are used by a design.
• Used and un-used configuration bits can affect 
a design when upset.
• Impossible to determine every bit that can affect 
a design because of:
– number of configuration bits, 
– state space complexity, and 
– time to perform injection.
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Investigating Potential Error Responses
• FI is analogous to turning a knob and waiting 
to see if an error occurs per knob turn:
– Real design – the wait time after the knob is turned 
can be significant (complex state-space).
– Many knobs to turn… impossible to turn every one 
for a real-design.  So must pick a subset.
• Hence, not all error responses can be 
observed.
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Error???
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FI Flow Diagram
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trst: clock-cycle time 
to seconds (s). 
tFI_inj: 
microseconds (μs) 
to s.
twait: μs to days.
tcorr: μs to s.
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State Space Complexity and Wait 
time
• When a configuration bit is flipped:
– The associated circuitry must be turned on (active) in 
order to determine if the inverted configuration bit 
will affect operation.
– Depending on the state of circuitry usage during FI, 
error responses can differ.
• Examples of complex state space and design 
operation:
– Design Startup process will be different than normal 
operation.
– On-off states.
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FI and The Design Startup Phase 
of Operation
• What happens during the beginning of 
operation… real-design versus test-circuit?
– Real-designs: Built-in-self-test, computer boot-up, 
register loading, Communication set-up/adjustments, 
etc,…
– Test-circuits: usually straight forward and there is 
little to no special start-up sequencing… but there 
can be.
• FI during set-up will not reflect most true error 
responses because real operation has not 
begun.  
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User must be aware of which states are operating 
when the configuration bit is inverted
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Time Required for SRAM-Based FPGA FI
• We define the total number of configuration bits for 
one fault injection campaign as #BitFI_inj. 
#BitFI_inj< NT
• The total time required (TfI_total) for a fault injection 
campaign is: 
TfI_total = #BitFI_inj *( tFI_inj + twait + tcorr + trst)
• The fault injection tool can control tFI_inj and tcorr.
• However twait and trst are design dependent.
• In real-designs twait can be days. As an example: 
think about a test campaign for designs with no 
errors injected – can take days to find a design flaw.  
State space exploration takes time.
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Understanding Configuration FI Error 
Responses
• Inverting the state of a 
configuration bit can have a 
variety of error responses:
– Stuck state (broken route or 
incorrect function definition),
– Incorrect logic behavior
– Oscillations (global routes).
• Most injections will cause 
broken routes, i.e., stuck faults
• Problem with stuck faults: 
– It is not known which 
configuration bit controls which 
portion of the design.
– If each Configuration bit FI is not 
held long enough, error 
responses will not be observed. 
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Configuration 
bits Combinatorial logic and DFF-
bits
Deliverable to NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program to be published on nepp.nasa.gov originally presented by Melanie D. Berg at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and the 
Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, La Jolla, CA, May 19-22, 2014.
Why Are You Performing FI?
• Do you want to know which configuration bits 
will affect your design if in error? (i.e., used 
configuration bits – or unused configuration 
bits that can cause contention upon SEU)
• If so, finding these “sensitive” configuration 
bits can be very time consuming:
– In most real-designs, it will be impossible to find 
every sensitive configuration bit.
– Test-designs generally have simple state spaces and 
can easily be fault injected.  
– However, keep in mind that all error responses of 
test circuits will not reflect an actual design
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Example of Fault Injecting a Counter (1)
• Table is an example of a 4-bit 
counter: 
– “4-bit counter” refers to 4 DFFs, 
combinatorial logic, and a clock.  
The number of associated 
configuration bits is unknown
– 24 states = 16 states.
• With a 100MHz clock, it would take 
16×10ns = 160ns to span the entire 4-
bit counter’s state space.
• 32-bit counter: 232 states =  
4294967296 states. 
• With a 100MHz clock, it would require 
approximately 43 s to span the entire 
32-bit counter’s state space. 
18
Deliverable to NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program to be published on nepp.nasa.gov originally presented by Melanie D. Berg at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and the 
Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, La Jolla, CA, May 19-22, 2014.
Example of Fault Injecting a Counter (2)
• The frequency that a bit 
inverts its state for a counter 
reduces by 2 as the bit order 
increases:  
– Least significant bit (b0) flips 
state every clock cycle
– Next bit (b1) flips state every two 
clock cycle, etc…
• Bits that flip frequently are 
easy to test, i.e., we can 
determine if they are stuck in 
a logic state quickly
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Example of Fault Injecting a Counter (3)
• The most significant bit is in a 
static state for half of the state 
space traversal time.  
• Hence, with a 100MHz clock, the 
most significant bit of the 32-bit 
counter is expected to stay at a 
logic ‘0’ or stay at a logic ‘1’ for 
approximately 22.5 s. 
• You will need to wait this long 
to determine if a configuration 
SEU has caused the DFF-bit to 
be stuck at ‘0’.
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Time Required for 32-bit Counter Fault 
Injection
• The total time required (TfI_total) for a fault injection 
campaign is: 
TfI_total = #BitFI_inj ×( tFI_inj + twait + tcorr + trst)
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• TfI_total is roughly 2100 days (5.7 years) for fault 
injecting a 32-bit counter. 
• 32-bit counters (and larger) are common in many 
designs.  
• Structures such as multipliers or dividers are 
exponentially more complex.
• Configuration fault injection of a full design is 
impractical.
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Benefits of FI
• Investigation of a portion of error responses 
(but not all possibilities can be covered).
• Evaluation of how DUT errors can affect a 
system, e.g., how faults can affect other devices
• Validation of test equipment (however, with the 
understanding that not all cases can be 
covered).
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Conclusions (1)
• No tool is available that lists all configuration 
bits that can affect a design (sensitive bits).
• When performing FI, SRAM-based FPGAs can 
have millions of configuration bits to inject.
• The combination of the number of 
configuration bits and twait, make FI impractical 
for developing a full characterization for DUT 
SEU error responses.
• SRAM-based configuration FI will not provide 
error rates.  It provides a glimpse into a DUT’s 
various error responses.
• Benefits of FI are: DUT and system level error 
response investigation.
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Conclusions (2)
Putting Things into Perspective
• A study that suggests that it can fault inject a 
design in seconds or hours:
– Is not covering the entire space of the design and will 
have a limited view of error responses, and/or
– Will not be able to determine all configuration bits that 
can affect design operation upon an SEU, and/or
– Is not implementing twait.
• A study that states that via SRAM-based fault 
injection they will provide an error rate:
– This type of injection cannot calculate error rates.  
You force a bit to flip, you know it will flip.  Hence, no 
rate is calculated.  Only error responses are observed 
if the FI is held long enough.
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